provocations, may be a lasting phase. In this regard, the Islamic Republic will have to increase its deterrence capabilities to avoid becoming the target of Israeli attacks. One of the possibilities Iran has on the table in case it needs to enhance its deterrence capacity is to resume uranium enrichment, which would ensure the continuation of avoiding an open conflict in the region while sending a clear message to Israel and the United States about Iran’s unwillingness to submit. Some suggest that Haqtalab’s words should be interpreted in this context.

The possibility of a change in Iran’s nuclear doctrine would entail a nuclear reorganization in the region that must also be taken into account. In this sense, both Saudi Arabia and Turkey could develop their nuclear capabilities, and the Zionist Entity could publicly acknowledge what is an open secret: the existence of its nuclear program.

Taking into account all of the above, the Iranian nuclear program, which for the moment remains within the civilian limits imposed by Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa issued in 2003, must be analyzed within a context that considers both the internal and external particularities of the current geopolitical situation. Any change in it should be analyzed based on the discursive principles upon which the Islamic Republic is founded, especially those that guarantee Iran’s independence and autonomy.

This was evident in the recent negotiations with the West to try to revive the nuclear agreement that was unilaterally dissolved by the United States. During those negotiations, the Islamic Republic, through its negotiating team, sought a fair agreement that would guarantee independence from the West in setting its own terms.